Week Ahead (13 October)

Monday, 13 October – France’s budget for 2026 to be tabled following reappointment of Lecornu as PM and formation of new cabinet 

Per the French Constitution, the budget for the following year “must be submitted no later than the first Tuesday in October".  However, following last Monday’s resignation of Sebastien Lecornu as Prime Minister, no government was in place to present a budget on Tuesday 7 October.   

President Macron formally reappointed Sebastien Lecornu as Prime Minister on Friday evening, ending a week-long political impasse following his brief resignation. Lecornu unveiled his new Cabinet on Sunday night, featuring a blend of technocrats and experienced centrists and only modest signs of political renewal. 

Roland Lescure, a close Macron ally, remains as Economy and Finance Minister, tasked with steering the country’s 2026 budget through the Assembly while addressing France’s 5.4% budget deficit. Lecornu is expected to present his 2026 budget today and deliver his policy address to Parliament in the coming days. His early focus will be on securing a working majority to pass the budget before 31 December. 

In talks with other parties during his first short tenure in power, Lecornu had presented a budget which was intended to bridge the gap between Bayrou’s €44 billion austerity plan and more redistributive alternatives. Lecornu had sought to recalibrate a softer approach with deficit-reduction targets closer to €35–36 billion. This was an olive branch to the left, while still promising fiscal responsibility to reassure the right.  However, these attempts ended up pleasing nobody in a deeply divided Assembly – least of all then-Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau of Les Republicains (LR), who indicated that he would not support a Lecornu government on this basis.  This ultimately resulted in Lecornu tabling his resignation to President Macron last Monday.  

The Socialists were pressing for the budget to contain what they termed “symbolic defeats” for Macronism, among them, the introduction of a 2% “Zucman tax” on ultra-wealthy households.  Lecornu toyed with the idea but ultimately refused to implement it. In addition, in a bid to differentiate himself from his predecessors, Lecornu pledged not to invoke Article 49.3 of the Constitution to push the budget through without a vote, a clear gesture to win Socialist goodwill and to project a new “method of compromise.” Yet, this pledge further alienated LR who saw it as capitulation to the left.   

After 48 hours of consultations with political parties, with the exception of Le Pen’s National Rally and Mélenchon’s LFI who refused to participate, Lecornu nevertheless concluded on Wednesday that it is possible to pass a 2026 budget by year end. In order to give sufficient time to examine the budget, as required by the Constitution, this will have to be tabled no later than 13 October. This feedback from Lecornu was sufficient for Macron, who went on to formally reappoint him on Friday evening in order to steer a budget through the Assembly. 

Lecornu is now confirmed as Prime Minister and will govern with the same narrow majority as before.  Although in caretaker mode, government supporting MPs (for now - LR support clearly not guaranteed) constitute 211 of the 577 seats as follows: 

• La Republique en Marche (ER - 91) 

• Groupe Droite républicaine/Les Republicains (LR - 50) 

• MoDem (LD - 36) 

• Le Group Horizon (HOR - 34) 

The opposition constitutes 364 of the 577 seats as follows: 

• Groupe Rassemblement National (RN - 123) 

• La France Insoumnise (LFI - 71) 

• Socialists (SOC - 69) 

• Groupe écologiste et social (E&S - 38) 

• Libertés, indépendants, outre-mer & territoires (LIOT - 22) 

• Groupe de la Gauche démocrate et républicaine (GDR - 17) 

• Groupe UDR (UDR - 15) 

• Non-attached (NI - 9) 

There are also two vacant seats which means that in theory there are 575 votes up for grabs.  

In a budget vote, a simple majority wins and abstentions don’t count – the strategy of the incoming Prime Minister will likely be to secure enough abstentions to pass a budget before 31 December 2025.   Our baseline fixed assumptions are as follows: 

• Against: RN 123, LFI 71, UDR 15 → 209 “no”. 

• Government core: Ensemble 91 + MoDem 36 + Horizons 34 → 161 “yes”.  

Thus 370 votes seem to be pre-determined.  The voting choices of the remaining 205 MPs from across the political spectrum although mostly left leaning (LR 50; LIOT 22; PS 69; EELV 38; GDR 17; NI 9) are in play.  Since his resignation, the strategy from Lecornu, by weakening the deficit reduction target while also reopening the question of pension reform, previously a red line for Macron, is to target these left leaning MPs.  In doing so, he risks the support of LR’s 50 MPs.  

The minimum left buy-in to pass a budget without LR is roughly PS (69) + E&S (38) voting YES while also securing the abstentions of the Communist GDR group (17) AND the centre right LIOT group (22) – this would see a budget passed by 268 votes to 259.  However, should LIOT, which leans right, vote against, the budget would fail unless the Communists can also be persuaded to vote in favour.  The last time said Communists voted in favour of a budget was in 2001 when they were part of the Jospin government.  They have consistently voted against budgets since then other than in 2013 when they abstained on a left leaning budget put forward by Francois Hollande.   

In other words, even though Lecornu’s reappointment restores short-term institutional stability, the structural impasse in the French legislature persists.  The above scenario shows how difficult the balancing act Lecornu is once again facing.  To that end, we maintain that, alongside the potential rollover of the 2025 budget by special decree, the deployment of Article 47 (3), which would see a budget passed by executive decree for the first time in French history remain on the table – notwithstanding the furious political opposition it is certain to generate.  

W/C Monday, 13 October – Meta expected to face charges under the DSA, joining X and TikTok 

The European Commission is expected to issue preliminary findings against Meta in the coming days, formally accusing the company of breaching the Digital Services Act (DSA). The move would make Meta the third Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) to face charges under the bloc’s online safety law, following X and TikTok. 

The investigation, launched in April 2024, centres on the platforms’ ‘’notice-and-action'’ mechanisms designed to allow users to flag illegal content. The Commission’s findings are expected to identify systemic shortcomings in how Meta handles such reports and moderates content across its platforms.  

Meta will be given the opportunity to respond to the preliminary assessment, but if the Commission’s concerns are confirmed, the company could face fines of up to 6% of its global annual turnover. The proceedings mirror earlier DSA cases opened against X and TikTok, though neither has yet resulted in financial penalties. The outcome of the first probe into X, launched in December 2023, remains pending and will serve as a key precedent for the enforcement framework. 

The upcoming charges against Meta come amid tightening DSA enforcement across the EU. Earlier in October, a Dutch court ruled that Facebook and Instagram’s default algorithmic feeds constitute a “dark pattern” under Article 25 of the DSA, ordering Meta to allow users in the Netherlands to set a chronological feed by default. The case, the first successful civil action invoking the DSA, highlights the growing use of both Commission-led and court-based enforcement tools against large platforms. 

At the geopolitical level, the new proceedings are likely to further strain transatlantic relations. The Trump administration has repeatedly criticised the DSA as well as the Digital Markets Act (DMA) as discriminatory measures targeting US firms, warning that strict enforcement could prompt retaliatory tariffs or sanctions against EU officials. Meta executives, including CEO Mark Zuckerberg, have lobbied Washington for support, arguing that the EU’s digital rulebook amounts to protectionism under a different name. 

Tuesday, 14 October – CJEU to hear European Parliament’s legal challenge over Commission’s unfreezing of Hungarian funds 

Tomorrow, the Court of Justice of the EU, the bloc’s highest court, will hold a hearing on the European Parliament’s lawsuit against the European Commission for its decision to unfreeze more than €10 billion in cohesion funds for Hungary in December 2023. The Parliament argues that the Commission prematurely lifted the conditionality measures linked to judicial independence and anti-corruption reforms, despite clear evidence that the Orban government had not implemented the required safeguards in practice. 

Back then, the Commission’s decision on the eve of a crucial European Council summit, where Hungary’s support was needed to approve aid for Ukraine. Critics described the move as politically motivated, arguing that Brussels traded its legal credibility for short-term unity. At the time, the Commission justified the unfreezing by citing judicial “reforms” passed by the Hungarian Parliament in May 2023, which had been negotiated behind closed doors. However, subsequent monitoring by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and other watchdogs showed that the reforms were largely cosmetic and failed to secure genuine independence in case assignment or judicial appointments. 

When the Commission released the funds, Orban lifted his veto threat on Ukraine’s EU accession, stepping out of the Council chamber during the vote — an outcome many MEPs saw as confirmation that the release of funds was politically driven. The Parliament’s lawsuit (Case C-225/24) seeks to annul the Commission’s decision on grounds of breach of the EU’s rule-of-law conditionality regulation and failure to uphold judicial independence as a precondition for disbursement. 

The hearing comes at a time of heightened tension between the EU institutions. In August 2025, the European Parliament also filed a separate case before the CJEU, this time against the Council, challenging the use of Article 122 of the Treaty to adopt the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence loan scheme without parliamentary involvement. Lawmakers argue that the €150 billion plan, adopted under emergency provisions, bypassed democratic scrutiny and co-decision, undermining the Union’s institutional balance. Both cases, along with successive motions of no-confidence against the Commission President, illustrate a widening rift between the Commission, Council and the European Parliament over the limits of executive discretion at times of political urgency. 

Thursday, 16 October – Next EDIP trilogue talks; budget and eligibility the issues to be resolved by European Parliament and EU capitals 

EU negotiators will reconvene on Thursday for a new round of trilogue talks on the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP), after last week’s late-night session in Strasbourg ended without agreement. The Danish Council presidency remains intent on striking a deal before the European Council later this month (23-24 October), but two key issues, the budget and the eligibility criteria, remain unresolved. 

The EDIP, tabled in March 2024 as part of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), is intended to contribute to the re-industrialisation of Europe’s defence base and incentivise joint procurement of weapons systems through subsidies and VAT exemptions. It currently has a proposed budget of €1.5 billion up to 2027, a figure the European Parliament considers insufficient given Europe’s rearmament needs. 

At Tuesday’s trilogue, the Commission tabled a compromise allowing industries without design authority to access EDIP funds if they commit to obtaining it by project completion, or repay the support otherwise. The proposal was rejected after objections from both sides, with Council representatives accusing the Commission of failing to consult member states. 

Beyond eligibility, the budget question remains wide open. Several options are under discussion to increase funding, including: 

• SAFE contributions from third countries such as the UK and Canada, which are negotiating participation in the €150 billion Security Action for Europe defence-loan programme, 

• Or/and the possible use of unused Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) resources. 

France, Germany and France have expressed openness to tapping leftover recovery funds, while others, notably the Netherlands, argue that any surplus should instead cover NextGenerationEU debt-servicing costs. The Commission is still assessing how much could realistically be reallocated. 

This week’s talks will seek to resolve at least the eligibility impasse, with ambassadors meeting on Friday to review the Commission’s proposal ahead of the trilogue.