Week Ahead (24 November)

W/C Monday, 24 November – Talks on US peace plan for Ukraine to accelerate ahead of soft 27 November deadline; EU moves to shape final text 

The diplomatic focus in Europe this week will be dominated by the evolving US–Russia effort to shape a 28-point roadmap for a potential peace deal in Ukraine. The initial release of the document last week, covering issues such as disengagement lines, verification mechanisms, phased sanctions relief and longer-term security guarantees, generated significant unease in European capitals, not least because the EU and UK were largely excluded from the early drafting. 

That dynamic shifted slightly on Sunday, when European officials, in particular the national security advisors of Germany, France and the UK, were invited to Geneva for consultations with the US team. This was the first structured opportunity for Europeans to offer technical and political feedback. Overall, the EU is now racing to ensure its positions are reflected in a process it was not originally invited to shape. In its pursuit to shape a final plan that would be more favourable to Ukraine and provide sufficient security guarantees for peacetime, the EU is likely to focus on two areas where it holds the most leverage: 

• the legal and political conditions for any sanctions-relief sequence, and 

• the status and potential use of frozen Russian state assets, which remain concentrated in the EU. 

Washington continues to treat 27 November as a working deadline for a consolidated draft, although US State Secretary Marco Rubio stressed yesterday that this date can “move” if negotiations require more time. Still, the US hopes to present a coherent text by year-end, which means the window for European influence is narrowing. 

This comes as the EU is struggling to advance its €140 billion asset-backed loan proposal, currently blocked by Belgium. Brussels cannot move forward without Belgian consent, as Euroclear — where the assets are held — falls directly under Belgian jurisdiction. The Belgian government fears a scenario in which assets must eventually be returned to Moscow following a peace deal, leaving Belgium financially and legally responsible for any resulting losses. Prime Minister Bart De Wever is demanding legally enforceable guarantees from fellow member states that any shortfall would be covered collectively. 

President von der Leyen has warned that, if Belgium does not shift position soon, the EU will have to resort to either joint borrowing or direct national contributions to support Ukraine. Both alternatives face political obstacles: high-debt member states object to national outlays, while northern capitals are wary of new common debt instruments. The objective remains to reach a political agreement at the 18 December European Council, the final summit of the year. 

European officials also raised broader strategic concerns during Sunday’s Geneva talks. These include: 

• the risk that sanctions relief is front-loaded or irreversible; 

• the absence of structured EU participation in core security discussions; 

• uncertainty over Russia’s compliance, especially on territorial lines and verification; 

• the potential for a “frozen conflict” dynamic if the agreement is not tightly sequenced; 

• whether the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in peacetime should be reduced to 600,000 personnel or remain at its current levels (800,000 – 850,000). 

Monday, 24 November – EU Trade Ministers to hold Foreign Affairs Council amid visit of US Commerce Secretary Lutnick to Brussels 

EU trade ministers meet in Brussels today for a Foreign Affairs Council focused on the Union’s relations with the US and China. A key feature of the day will be the visit of US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, accompanied by US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, who will join ministers over lunch for a strategic discussion on tariffs, supply chains and the future of the August EU–US Framework Agreement. This is the first time since summer that both US trade principals sit around the table with all EU trade ministers, indicative of Washington’s desire to shape the coming phase of transatlantic negotiations. 

Despite the deal in August, uncertainty remains high. Most elements have been implemented, but Washington continues to impose new sector-specific tariffs. The meeting comes as the EU prepares its “implementation action plan” for Washington, due later this month. Lutnick is expected to press the EU on US concerns over CBAM, CS3D and parts of the digital rulebook, while EU ministers will seek clarity on the US side’s tariff trajectory. Brussels’ priorities include lowering tariffs on remaining sensitive exports, securing quota-based relief for steel and aluminium currently facing 50% rates, and obtaining assurances against further US measures in sectors already covered by the August deal. A draft 27-page list prepared by DG TRADE ahead of the meeting included wines, spirits, pasta, olive oil, cheese, diamonds, industrial equipment, fabrics, shoes and ceramics in the list of sensitive EU goods seeking exemption. Meanwhile, the bloc has insisted that no reopening of core EU regulatory files is on the table. Still, the relatively restrained DMA enforcement and slow progress in the DSA’s inaugural probes have fuelled speculation that Brussels is already adjusting its posture to avoid inflaming negotiations. 

China will be the second major focus. The temporary Trump–Xi truce in Busan on 30 October paused new US tariffs and suspended China’s rare-earth export controls for one year, but tensions remain. The EU is shifting from monitoring to active protection against Chinese overcapacity: following the EV anti-subsidy duties of up to 35% in 2024, Brussels has also announced new steel safeguards that sharply cut duty-free volumes. China’s broader strategy, subsidised industrial dumping combined with coercive control of critical minerals, continues to expose structural vulnerabilities. This was further highlighted recently by Chinese exports controls targeting Nexperia chips which triggered shortages in the EU automotive industry.   

Finally, member states will also receive a state-of-play update on the EU’s diversification agenda. Negotiations with India, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and the UAE continue, while agreements with Mercosur, Mexico and Indonesia are ready for finalisation. The India FTA remains the central plank of Brussels’ Indo-Pacific strategy, offering diversification away from China in critical raw materials, pharmaceuticals and industrial supply chains. In parallel, the Commission is pursuing minerals-focused cooperation with Australia, reflecting a shift towards targeted, strategic agreements rather than full FTAs. 

Tuesday, 25 November – European Parliament to hold plenary vote on whether to sue Commission over withdrawal of SEPs proposal 

This week’s Strasbourg plenary will feature a politically charged vote on whether the European Parliament should take the European Commission to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) over its decision to withdraw the Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) regulation from the 2025 Work Programme. The move follows a contentious push by a new ad-hoc right-wing coalition, comprised of the centre-right EPP, the right-wing ECR, and the far-right Patriots for Europe and ESN, to escalate the dispute after the Commission formally removed the file earlier this year, arguing that no agreement among member states was foreseeable. 

This follows the JURI (Parliamentary Committee for Legal Affairs) committee’s closed-door vote earlier this month, where 14 MEPs backed legal action and eight opposed, authorising Parliament’s legal service to challenge the withdrawal before the CJEU. Rapporteur René Repasi (S&D) framed the issue as a defence of Parliament’s legislative prerogatives, criticising parts of the centre-right EPP for “teaming up with the far-right” in order to block what he views as an essential reform of the EU’s patent licensing environment. 

The withdrawn draft regulation – backed strongly by Nordic and Baltic governments and major tech/automotive firms such as Microsoft, Amazon, Stellantis, Volkswagen and Deutsche Telekom – sought to streamline licensing for technologies such as 5G and Wi-Fi, reduce litigation and improve transparency. The Commission’s withdrawal, driven in part by German and French concerns about burdens on patent holders, triggered strong reactions from industry and from MEPs who view the file as central to Europe’s innovation competitiveness and argue that the Commission overstepped its mandate and interfered with Parliament’s legislative role. 

It is worth noting that this dispute marks the second high-profile legal challenge by Parliament against the EU executive in recent months. In August, MEPs also voted to sue the Commission and the Council over the use of Article 122 to fast-track the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence loans package, bypassing Parliament’s scrutiny. Taken together, the two cases highlight a widening institutional confrontation over the limits of the Commission’s powers and Parliament’s demand for greater democratic accountability in EU decision-making. 

Wednesday, 26 November – CJEU hearings on Meta’s appeals on Commission’s alleged far-reaching RFIs 

On Wednesday, the Court of Justice will hear two linked appeals brought by Meta Platforms (Cases C-496/23 P and C-497/23 P) concerning the Commission’s use of far-reaching requests for information (RFIs) during competition investigations. The hearings follow Meta’s January 2024 appeals against two General Court judgements from May 2023, which had fully upheld the Commission’s approach. 

Both cases centre on whether the Commission, under Regulation 1/2003, can demand extensive internal documents using broad search terms, and under what safeguards personal data and privacy must be protected. 

The first appeal (C-496/23) concerns the Commission’s 2020 RFI issued in the Facebook Marketplace investigation, part of a probe into whether Meta tied Marketplace to Facebook’s social network and imposed unfair conditions on rivals. Meta argued that the RFI, which required extensive internal documents identified through wide search terms, was disproportionate and insufficiently justified. The General Court disagreed, confirming the Commission’s broad discretion under Regulation 1/2003 to define RFIs and compel large-scale document searches. 

The second case (C-497/23) stems from a parallel 2020 RFI concerning Meta’s data-related practices. Here, Meta again claimed that the request was excessively expansive and risked sweeping in large volumes of irrelevant personal data. The General Court upheld the Commission’s approach but emphasised that strict filtering mechanisms, such as a virtual data room, must be used to protect sensitive information. 

Both appeals ultimately ask the CJEU to clarify the legal limits and proportionality standards for search-term-based RFIs, including how far the Commission can go in demanding internal emails, drafts and communications, and what safeguards must be in place for personal data. The hearings are therefore significant not only for Meta but for the Commission’s wider investigative toolkit in competition enforcement, particularly in digital markets. The hearings also come at a time when Meta continues to face scrutiny at the EU level, with ongoing DMA and DSA proceedings in Brussels. 

Wednesday, 26 November – UK Chancellor Reeves to unveil politically controversial Autumn 2026 Budget amid fiscal pressures and market scrutiny 

The UK’s Autumn Budget will be presented on Wednesday under acute political and economic pressure, with Chancellor Rachel Reeves seeking to close a sizeable fiscal gap while preserving Labour’s manifesto commitments and her own fiscal rules. Despite a more favourable OBR pre-budget forecast narrowing the estimated shortfall to around £20 billion, Treasury officials still see a funding need closer to £50 billion once buffers are included. However, markets remain highly sensitive: the UK currently faces the highest borrowing costs in the G7, with 30-year gilt yields persistently above 5%. 

Reeves originally prepared a package centred on raising income tax rates by 2p while reducing national insurance contributions. This was a clear breach of Labour’s electoral manifesto in 2024 but one intended to demonstrate fiscal discipline. That strategy collapsed earlier in November following strong opposition from cabinet ministers and Labour backbenchers, who warned of a “betrayal of trust” and raised the spectre of a leadership challenge against Keir Starmer. The subsequent U-turn triggered a gilt sell-off, as investors had anticipated a more substantial revenue-raising move. 

As a result, the Budget is now expected to rely on less politically contentious measures. The centrepiece is likely to be a two-year freeze in income-tax thresholds, extending the Sunak-era freeze and raising an estimated £7.5–10 billion through fiscal drag as inflation and nominal wages rise. Additional options under consideration include tighter rules on salary-sacrifice schemes, changes to dividend taxation and targeted levies on specific professions — all of which avoid breaching Labour’s headline tax promises but still risk being viewed as indirect tax increases by voters. Likewise, large-scale spending cuts appear unlikely. Reeves’ earlier attempt to reduce welfare expenditure was already watered down after resistance from the Labour left. 

The Budget announcement comes amid an increasingly challenging political climate for the Labour government. Starmer’s favourability has fallen to a record low (19% favourable, 73% unfavourable), and internal discontent has intensified. The latest compromise on budgetary plans, decreases the possibility of a leadership challenge after the Budget. However, the May 2026 mayoral elections could be a turning point, as heavy defeats would once again lead members within his party to directly challenge his authority.  

Overall, the Budget is shaping up as a delicate balancing act with little room for error. Reeves must demonstrate fiscal seriousness without triggering further political instability, a difficult task when the measures available are either economically insufficient or politically costly, and where the likely outcome is dissatisfaction on both fronts, the markets and Labour’s electoral base.